Denver Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 8

Article 7

1934

Vol. 11, no. 8: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
11 Dicta (1934).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DICTA

VOLUME 11
1933-1934

DICTA
TKE DENV MR

$1.75 a year

20 cents a copy

JUNE, 1934
PAGE

Dicta Observes

-

S-

-

The Higher Law -

.

-

-

-

...

201
203

By J. W. Kelley

Some Constitutional Ang les of the "New Deal"

-

207

.

213

By Sidney S. Jacobs
Dictaphun

-

-

-

Supreme Court Decisions

...

215

Published monthly *by the Denver Bar Association and devoted to
the interests of the Association.
Address all communications concerning:
Editorial Matters, to Dicta, Roy 0. Samson, Editor-in-Chief,
1020 University Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Advertising, to Dicta, Sydney H. Grossman and M. 0. Edison,
Business Managers, 618 Symes Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Subscriptions, to Dicta, James A. Woods, Secretary Denver Bar
Association, 1022 Midland Savings Bldg., Denver, Colo.

DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
1933-1934
FRAZER ARNOLD, President
PERCY S. MORRIS, First Vice-President
FRED W. SANBORN, JR., Second Vice-President
JAMES A. WOODS, Secretary-Treasurer
Business Office: 1022 Midland Savings Building. Phone: MA. 6146

EXECUTIVE SECTION
TRUSTEES
DUDLEY W. STRICKLAND, FRANK E. GovrFRAZER ARNOLD, ex-officio
to July 1. 1935
GUy K. BREWSTER, ERNEST B. FOWLER
GOLDING FAIRFIELD, HARRY S. SILVERto July 1, 1934
STEIN to July 1, 1936

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
Luncheons
Percy Morris

Medical-Legal
Charles A. Mantz
Outing
Floyd F. Walpole

Banquets
Lowell White

Memorial
Milton D. Green

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SECTION
New Court House
American Law Institute
Criminal Justice
Frank L. Fetzer
Bernard J. Seeman
Robert L. Stearns
Judiciary
Won 2en and Children
William E. Hutton
Ma ary F. Lathrop
BAR STANDARDS AND LEGAL AID SECTION
Legal Aid
Legal Education
Grieance
Ethics
John F. Rotru ck
Robert W. Steele
G. Dexter Blount
Simon J. Heller
PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION
Citizenship
Kenaz Huffmian

Membership
Gail L. Ireland

JudicialSalaries
Hamlet J. Barry

Pressand Bar
Joseph A. Myers

GENERAL
Legislative
Auditing
Joseph P. Constantine
William D. Morrison
Justice Court--Sub-Committee
Gustave J. Ornauer

Publicity
Tom L. Pollo ck

Justice Court
Horace N. Hawkins

DICTA
EDITORIAL BOARD
ROY 0. SAMSON
Editor-in-Chief
B. C. HILLIARD, JR., Dictaphun
WM. H. ROBINSON, JR., Associate Editor

LOUIs A. HELLERSTEIN, Adviser
DAYTON DENIOUS, Trial Court Decisions
FRED Y. HOLLAND, Historian

SYDNEY H. GROSSMAN and MOLLY 0. EDISON, Business Managers
Supreme Court Decisions
GEORGE LONGFELLOW,
MARTIN C. MOLHOLM
C.4CLYDE BARKER, Editor
ROBERT PALMER
NATHAN R. KOBEY
ERNEST C. BURCK

JR.

DICTA
Vol. XI

JUNE, 1934

No. 8

'Dicta Observes

A

"LAW DAY"

TRACTING to the conference some two hundred
lawyers from Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska, the
first annual Law Day, sponsored by the School of Law
of the University of Colorado, was pronounced a distinct contribution to legal development in the State of Colorado. The
general subject for discussion at the Law Day held at Boulder,
May 19, 1934, was the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court. The morning conference was devoted to a discussion
of the power of the Supreme Court to bring about procedural
reform through the rule-making power. Further inquiry into
the extent of the rule-making power occupied the attention of
the afternoon conference, particularly with reference to bar
organization and discipline.
The Hon. Earle W. Evans, President of the American
Bar Association, was the guest speaker of the day. Speaking before a large audience of lawyers and their guests, Mr.
Evans stressed the changes which were creeping into the attorneys' field as he outlined a program of enlarged activity
for the younger members of the bar.
One thought became increasingly evident to those attending Law Day and that thought was that not only did
the Supreme Court of Colorado have a vast inherent power
to bring about procedural reform and bar integration, but
that the Court was even discussing the problem with a view
toward bringing about an integrated bar in Colorado. It also
became increasingly evident as the conference progressed that
Colorado was lagging far behind neighboring states in the
matter of bar organization, as all of the surrounding states,
except Nebraska, had already committed themselves to some
plan of bar integration.
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The morning session, presided over by Ernest H.
Rhoads, President of the Colorado Bar Association, was
opened by a paper read by Judge Robert Steele, which paper
made a preliminary survey of the field of discussion and
pointed out the problems and the possibilities attendant upon
the rule-making power.
Following Judge Steele, Mr. John H. Denison suggested
several innovations in the code of civil procedure, and urged
the reform of pleadings and the elimination of waste of time
and money over unnecessary haggling in pleadings. The next
speaker, Hon. Stanley Johnson, Judge of the Juvenile Court
of Denver, read a paper in which he outlined needed reforms
in the control of delinquents and in the state homes for dependents and offenders. The last paper of the morning was
read by Roy 0. Samson, editor of DICTA, who discussed
procedural reform in the justice courts, emphasizing the need
of purging the justice courts of persons who practiced there,
although not licensed as attorneys.
The afternoon conference, presided over by Fraser
Arnold, President of the Denver Bar Association, devoted itself mainly to the discussion of the possible integration and
organization of a State Bar. G. Dexter Blount, the incoming
President of the Denver Bar Association, pointed out clearly
in a paper which he read that the Supreme Court of Colorado had the inherent power tO discipline and to organize the
bar, and he showed further that the present machinery and
organization now set up was inadequate and entirely out of
date. In his discussion of the integrated bar movement, Allan
Moore, Director of the Legislative Reference Bureau, pointed
out the many channels which the integrated movement had
taken and tentatively suggested the advisability of a judicial
council.
Following Mr. Moore, Lowell White, President of the
Law Club of Denver, discussed the problem of bar organization in Colorado under rule-making power of the Supreme
Court demonstrating that the Supreme Court had the power
to integrate the bar.
Although the conference formally adjourned at 5:30
p. m., many of the attendants were present at the annual
dinner of the Bar Association of the Eighth Judicial District.

THE HIGHER LAW
By J. W. KELLEY, of the Denver Bar

WtHEN WILLIAM H. SEWARD, replying to the argument
that Negro slave property should not be taken without lawful process, declared there was a "higher
law," many doubted the accuracy of his statement. A few
years later the guarantees regarding slave property contained
in the constitution were swept away before the operation of
the superior and overwhelming power which Mr. Seward
had pointed out. The law which forbids irregular excesses
in human affairs acted with unconquerable force to correct a
specific wrong. It was no general moral reform, for other
abuses were left untouched. It is claimed now that this
"higher law" is the law of overwhelming necessity; or the
universal law of supply and demand; or the all-embracing
law of nature, superior to all others, and having a sovereign
contempt for man-made statutes.
At least three times in the past century this inexorable
but little understood law has operated, despite the guarantee
of constitutions, to deprive owners of property of billions of
dollars of its value. The same law, which has been almost
entirely unstudied by lawyers, because not justiciable in
courts, also quickly restores the values it has caused to disappear.
In 1893, and several years succeeding, this law brought
about what was termed a panic but which now is described
by the less terrifying name of depression. Prices plunged
downward; wool sold for three cents a pound. In 1894
Coxey's Army marched on Washington; in 1895 the government issued bonds to raise $62,000,000, which was considered a great sum in those days; in 1896 we made another
bond issue of $100,000,000; in 1897 the pendulum began
to swing the other way; wheat went to $1.00 a bushel and
for the first time in our history our exports totaled over a
billion dollars in one year. In 1898 the Spanish-American
war broke out and a stamp tax was imposed which was virtually a sales tax. These stamps produced $200,000,000 in
revenue in a single year. A war loan of $200,000,000, at 3
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per cent, was offered and fourteen hundred millions was subscribed. The "higher law" had restored the vanished values
and five years after the 1893 panic came its effects had entirely disappeared.
Efforts have been made to trace these sudden and remarkable changes in the country's condition to the influence of a
large or small annual gold production. When in 1898 Bryan
ran against McKinley for president the claim was asserted
that unless large and immediate additions were made to our
metallic money no revival of business could be expected. History seemed willing to verify the complaint. In 1850 our
gold production had been $50,000,000. The yearly addition to the supply of gold constantly grew less until in 1896
it had decreased to $35,000,000. Upon the election of McKinley to the presidency the theory that was decisively repudiated at the polls by his election seemed vindicated by
immense annual additions to our stock of gold which had
for so many years been withheld. Benign nature unlocked
great stores of gold in Alaska and Colorado, and its yearly
output steadily increased until in 1915 the United States
mined $101,000,000. Then the supply which had grown
so generous declined until in 1927 it was five million below
what it was back in 1850. Some students of the higher law
find in these figures the cause of the country's present condition.
Inflation, obnoxious to this higher law because sudden
and irregular, has received blame. In 1917, when we entered the world war, there began the most stupendous money
expenditure the world has ever known. We poured out a
million dollars an hour for twenty-five months. When the
armistice was signed our outlay for war purposes was fortyfour million dollars daily. We loaned the Allies, first and
last, over ten billion dollars which was nearly all returned by
them in trade with us. Our exports quickly rose to eight
billions a year. To say that there is no law that inflicts quick
and decisive penalties as a result of such sudden and momentous changes would be to deny the common experience of mankind. With 8,500,000 men dead as a result of the war the
readjustment following this vast and unprecedented expendi-
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ture and its abrupt stop could only be what always occurs
when overflowing abundance is followed by rigid abstinence.
No statutes could correct the condition brought about by a
violation of a law which, by whatever name it is called, condemns and punishes sudden excesses of every kind against the
consequences of which no provision is made. A people trained
to provide against the extremes of heat and cold, drouth and
flood, might be expected to guard against the reaction certain to follow sudden inflation and overwhelming prosperity,
but apparently no student of the higher law was on guard.
We are depending with childlike faith on congress to
remonetize silver and enable us to capture the trade of silver
standard countries; yet in 1920, obedient to the law that
transcends all the artificial aids of legislation, the price of
silver rose to $1.34 an ounce and we acquired 16 per cent of
the commerce of the 102 countries of the world. Then, on
the decline of the price of silver, we quickly lost all but 8 per
cent.
How this could happen without the aid and guidance
of a Recovery Act or Reconstruction Corporation sorely puzzles the quid nuncs who view all phenomena in trade or government as the direct result of legislation.
By common consent the interpretation of this higher
law has been given over to leaders of finance, heads of universities and persons who admit or claim to be statesmen.
But the watchmen in the tower gave us no warning when
the dread consequences of the violation of this higher law
recently approached. They appeared to think the true study
of world affairs was in observing tariffs, stock markets, crop
reports and statistics relating to crime and its punishment.
A large responsibility has descended upon the legal profession. Whenever lawyers assemble to winnow the chaff of
the reform of legal procedure from the wheat, and give ear to
the public's complaints of the law's delay, some time should
be devoted by them to a discussion of the state of the nation.
All other agencies trusted with the study of the higher
law having lamentably failed only the lawyer remains on
guard. The times call to the legal profession to examine life
in its largest dimensions, not in its minor littlenesses. The
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higher law has strewn the shores of time with the wrecks of
vanished nations. Probably while Rome was hastening to its
fall men's minds were trifling with analysis of the percentage
of convictions in criminal cases, the need of reform in court
procedure and the shocking increase of divorce. Nero's fiddling has its counterpart in every age.

DO I GET ANY MORE THAN I AM GOING TO GET?
The following letter, we are informed by a correspondent, is an
exact copy of one received not long ago in the War Department:
Adjiten General of the Army,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Adjiten, General, Sir:My husband was induced into the surface eighteen months ago
and I ain't received no pay since he was gone. Please send my elopment
as I have a four months old baby and he is my only support and I
kneed every day to buy food and keep us in clothes. I am a poor
woman and all I have is gone. Both sides of my parents are very old
and I can't expect anything from them as my mother has been in bed
for thirteen years with one doctor and she won't take another. Do I
get any more than I am going to get? Please send me a letter and tell
me if my husband made application for a wife and child and please send
me a wife's form to fill out. I have all ready written to the President
and got me no answer and if I don't here from you I will write Uncal
Sam about you and him.
Yours truly,
MRS. PETER RICKETTS.

P. S. I am told that my husband sets in the YMCA every night
with a piano playing in his uniform. I think you will find him there.

SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ANGLES OF THE
"NEW DEAL"
By SIDNEY S. JACOBS, of the Denver Bar
HE

executive and legislative departments of the United

States government have cooperated to create some of the
most unusual legislation and governmental machinery
that has ever existed in the history of the United States.
That the "New Deal" is both popular and unpopular with
certain portions of the public is a matter of every day knowledge. What the judicial department of the government will
find concerning the constitutionality of the new legislation,
however, is a matter of great conjecture and anxiety at this
time. It is the intention of the author to present some of the
constitutional problems which may arise concerning the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the two principal statutes
of the "New Deal."
Before commencing a discussion of the legality of said
acts it may be well to explain briefly what each of these acts
proposes to do. The N. I. R. A. is an attempt to bring back
prosperity by increasing the purchasing power of consumers.

It proposes to increase this purchasing power by creating
codes of fair competition which fix prices, control output,
raise wages, shorten hours of labor, and abolish or limit child
labor. The A. A. A. is an experiment intended to raise the income of farmers. It proposes to do this by limiting the
amount of crops planted so that production may be controlled
and higher prices obtained. Farmers who cooperate with the
government by reducing crops planted are to remunerated
from process taxes placed upon manufactured articles.
In dealing with the constitutionality of the acts in
question a distinction should be made between codes that are
signed voluntarily and those which are imposed upon employers, industries and farmers against their will. The former class probably are valid inasmuch as they are contracts
voluntarily entered into for the benefit of third party beneficiaries also; because the contracting parties hope indirectly
to benefit themselves. An interesting decision on this point
207
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was recently banded down in the Denver District Court by
Judge Frank McDonough, Sr., who allowed employes to
recover from their employer minimum wages set by a code
which had been voluntarily signed by a restaurant owner.
There is the possibility, however, that some code agreements
which are signed voluntarily may be held unconstitutional if
the signing was caused by duress. Where codes are arbitrarily
imposed, however, a different problem arises. Codes of the
latter type will be considered hereafter in this article.
It must be remembered that the United States government is a government of restricted powers; that only certain
designated powers are given to it, and that under the tenth
amendment to the constitution, "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people."
Therefore, if the aforementioned acts are to be
found constitutional, some specific authority of congress to
pass them must be found.
Section I of the N. I. R. A. declares that "a disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people," exists in this country.
It may be concluded from the above declaration that the constitutionality of the act is based upon the power of congress
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, or to provide for
the public welfare. The latter ground will be considered
first.
It has been repeatedly held that the "general welfare
clause" is merely incidental to the power of congress to tax,
and that said clause does not confer any new power upon congress.1 The clause in question is Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, which reads as follows: "The congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." In view of the above, it is practically certain that
1
Temple Law Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No.
Rev. 548.

1, page 6; and 36 Harvard Law
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the constitutionality of the acts in question cannot be sustained under the "general welfare" clause.
A more difficult question is presented, however, as to
whether or not the acts in question are a valid regulation of
interstate and foreign commerce. The general rule seems to
be that it is unconstitutional for congress to attempt to regulate prices, 2 hours of employment, child labor,' and wages in
the industries under the guise of regulating interstate commerce.4 The most famous decision on this point was made
in The Child Labor Case, Hammer vs. Dagenhart.5 In that
case an act of congress was held unconstitutional which intended to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child
labor. The court stated:
"In our view the necessary effect of this act is, by means of a

prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary

commercial commodities, to regulate the hours of labor of children in
factories and mines within the states, a purely state authority. Thus
the act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not only
transcends the authority delegated to congress over commerce but also
exerts a power to a purely local matter to which the federal authority
does not extend."

Furthermore, the imposition of codes prescribing minimum wages probably constitute a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of Amendment 5 of the Constitution, for it has been
held that liberty includes the right to make contracts of employment upon such terms as the employer and employe think
proper.6
Proponents of the constitutionality of the N. R. A. and
the A. A. A. claim that though the acts would probably be unconstitutional in normal times, that because they are predicated upon an emergency, and because they are expressly limited to two years, they are constitutional under the police
power of the government." In support of this position the
'47 Supreme Court Reporter 426.
'259 U. S. 20 and 247 U. S. 251.
"Nation, October 18, 1933.
5247 U. S. 251.
'262 U. S. 522, 208 U. S. 161, 236 U. S. 1.
'Temple Law Quarterly. Vol. VIII, No. 1, page 3.
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cases of Wilson vs. New,' Block vs. Hirsh,' Marcus Brown
Holding Co. vs. Feldman,'0 and Wolff Packing Cases 1 are
cited.
Wilson vs. New held constitutional an act of congress
which for 30 days only set minimum wages and maximum
hours for employes of trains engaged in interstate commerce.
The act was designed to prevent a strike which would have
stifled interstate commerce, and is quite different from an attempt to regulate intrastate conditions of employment in factories, stores, etc. The Wolff Packing Cases cannot be considered authority for the acts of the "New Deal," because
there the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act, which
gave an administrative board the authority to fix the terms
of contracts of employment, was held unconstitutional. Any
statements in favor of the constitutionality of such acts as are
considered here are only obiter dicta.
Block vs. Hirsh and Marcus Brown Holding Co. vs.
Feldman were decided together, involve the same facts, and
are known as "The Rent Cases." The former case involved
an act of congress for the District of Columbia, and the latter
case a statute of New York. During the world war so many
people flocked to Washington, D. C., and New York City
on official business that it became almost impossible for government officials to rent a house in those cities at a reasonable
rent. Consequently, statutes were passed which allowed tenants to continue in possession of premises after the end of the
term, and against the Will of the landlord, provided the tenants paid rents which a commission determined were reasonable. The statutes were to be in effect for only two years.
The statutes in each of these cases were held constitutional.
In the decision of the court it was stated, "A limit in time,
to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that
could not be upheld as a permanent change."
The court
based authority for the act in the police power of the government, and states, "The only matter that seems to us open to
debate is whether the statute goes too far. For just as there
'243 U.
'256 U.
1"256 U.
u262 U.

S.
S.
S.
S.

332.
135.
170.
522.
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comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves only
that of eminent domain, it may be conceded that regulations
of the present sort pressed to a certain height might amount
to a taking without due process of law."
Whether the police power provides sufficient constitutional authority for acts such as the N. I. R. A. and the
A. A. A. is indeed a border line question, and one which the
writer will not be so vain as to attempt to answer. The acts
in the "Rent Cases" and the acts of the "New Deal" both are
limited to two years. Both recite that they are based upon an
emergency. In the Rent Cases the emergency was a war.
Whether a depression can be considered such an emergency as
would justify the government in doing things normally unconstitutional is yet to be decided. Then, too, the N. I. R. A.
and the A. A. A. attempt to regulate many more things than
simply the regulation of rent, and in the decision of the
"Rent Cases" Justice Holmes recognizes that there is a point
at which the police power ceases, and that the going beyond
that point would be taking property without due process of
law. In a more recent decision, 12 Justice Holmes discusses the
"Rent Cases" in the following language: "The late decisions
upon laws dealing with the congestion of, Washington and
New York, caused by the war, dealt with laws intended to
meet a temporary emergency and providing for compensation
determined to be reasonable by an impartial board. They
went to the verge of the law but fell far short of the present
act."
Those who, in view of past decisions, believe that the
N. I. R. A. and the A. A. A. are unconstitutional claim that
the acts attempt to make permanent economic changes rather
than temporary changes and that the "emergency" will not
abate but will continue. They say that if the acts succeed
that they will not be done away with, but will be intensified."8 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Mahon, supra, the court
stated, "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu"Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Mahon. 43 Supreme Court Reporter 158.
UNation, October 18, 1933.
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tional way of paying for the change." If it is true that permanent changes are being made, nothing short of a constitutional amendment should justify the change; otherwise the
Constitution would become a mere scrap of paper.
In wagering what decision the Supreme Court will hand
down it should be remembered that in the past the court has
always been very conservative and very prone to protect
vested property, rights; that the Child Labor Case and the
Rent Cases are five to four decisions; that the personnel of
the court is slightly changed from what it was; that it might
prove very unpopular for the court to declare the acts unconstitutional; and that congress and the president could exercise
their power of packing the Supreme Court by adding new
justices as was done during the legal tender cases in the seventies.14
There are other constitutional angles concerning said
acts which cannot be considered in this article (such as an
improper delegation of the powers of the legislature to the
executive department of the government). It is interesting to
note that in the only decision by a federal judge down to the
time of the writing of this article, the N. I. R. A. was held
unconstitutional. In that case Judge Alexander Akerman
refused to enjoin a St. Petersburg, Florida, cleaner who was
charging prices below those set by the N. R. A. code. In his
decision Judge Akerman said, "It would require a stretch of
imagination beyond the power of this court to concede that
a local industry engaged in the pressing, cleaning, and dyeing
of clothes was engaged in interstate commerce . . ." The
Constitution gave the national government no authority "to
invade the reserve power of the states in regulation of a local
industry even in an emergency."
1
"Nation, October 18, 1933.
"The U. S. News, December 11, 1933, page 16.

PDictaphun_
HAVE A CARE, JUDGE!
In the issue of DICTA immediately preceding this, we observe
an announcement by Judge Denison that he is collecting choice judicial
mispeaks. A sample or two, culled or purloined from the Colorado
reports, were appended. Our research department reports that the
samples were not from any of Judge Denison's opinions.

GO AHEAD AND HAVE FUN, WE GET THE JOBS
Green with envy because of the widespread publicity given by this
column of free speech to the New Deal Note of Joe Thomas, Esq.,
Edward L. Wood, Esq., Denver solicitor, and graduate of Stanford
University, hotbed of Hooverism, submits an epistle addressed by an
embattled Iowa farmer to the Secretary of Agriculture. Contributions
from other Republican barristers will be welcomed for, as is well
known, Republican lawyers have lots of time to write, whereas we
The forlorn farmer
Democrats are too busy examining abstracts.
speaks:
Dear Sir:
About three weeks ago Jonas, the Don Juan of the pig lot, broke
into the pen of Esmerelda, my prize brood sow. I'm a little worried
about this and hurry to write you for instructions.
Esmerelda has been about the place three or four years. She is a
great family pig, and in the past her litters have run from 19 to 27. I
signed up under the corn-hog program and I don't want to lose any of
my rights under that contract. I don't want to go back on my word,
either.
As said, if Esmerelda keeps up her pace as a mama pig she just
as like as not will have a family of around 20 or 25. The way I figured
it out when I signed up with you Esmerelda was booked for a place
on the birth control program this season. In fact, she wasn't to have
any babies.

214

DICTA

Carlotta, Dottie M. and Danzie IV were going to take care of the
production on my place this year under the corn-hog program. I figured
that as they have always been more reasonable and conservative they
wouldn't go beyond my pig quota, which is 27. Thae gives them nine
apiece and figures out about right. I'm entitled to that many.
Now, Esmerelda and Jonas, I'm afraid; have upset my calculations. What am I to do about it? Shall I kill Esmerelda right away?
I sort of hate to do that.
It's too late to do anything about Jonas, and Carlotta, Dottie M.
and Danzie IV. I'm a good soldier and want to obey orders. I don't
want any more pigs than I'm entitled to. Shall I let nature take its
course, or what?
And, Mr. Wallace, there's something else. On my southeast 20
which I had plowed up last fall I notice some corn already coming up.
I guess when the men hauled the corn from the field last fall they must
have spilled some kernels and they've started to grow. If they mature
I will have more corn than the acreage I contracted for uander the cornhog program and I don't want to do that. Still, it seems a shame to
start pulling up these plants that are trying to grow.
Just as like as not if I let them grow they'll exceed my acreage
quota and I'll be doing something that I hadn't ought to do. I'm entitled to 62.0007% acres. This self-raised corn will throw that all out
of kilter. What if some inspector comes along and checks up and finds
I'm raising more corn than I should and sees the condition Esmerelda
is in? Will I have to go to jail? And if I do, will it be a Federal
prison or some place closer to home?
And, Mr. Wallace, won't you or Mr. Tugwell or some of you, tell
me what I'm going to do about Esmerelda?
Yours very respectfully,

H. SWOOLEY.

PLEDGES--COUNTY TREASURER-DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN BANK-

Horton as Treasurer vs. Grant McFerson as State Bank Commissioner-No. 13423-Decided February 19, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Horton as treasurer of El Paso County brought action against
McFerson as State Bank Commissioner, who was in possession of the
assets of the State Savings Bank at Colorado Springs. When the bank
closed the treasurer had $39,233.90 on deposit in the bank and before
the bank closed the bank entered into a trust agreement with the treasurer whereby the bank deposited $25,000.00 in liberty bonds with the
First National Bank of Colorado Springs as trustee to secure deposits
up to the amount of $25,000.00. McFerson sought to receive a dividend on the entire $39,233.90 before being required to resort to his
security, but the Court decreed that the bonds be sold for not less than
$25,000.00 and the proceeds delivered to the treasurer, the overplus. if
any, to be paid to the commissioner, such proceeds to be applied against
the $39,233.90, and that the commissioner pay to the treasurer a dividend of 50% on the balance.
1. As to the pledged security, there was no reason for the County
Treasurer to expect the Bank Commissioner to offer anything more advantageous than the sum of $25,000.00 in cash.
2. The trust agreement defined the precise amount of the deposits that were contemplated and the limit and extent of the security
which was only to the extent of $25,000.00.
3. All deposits in excess of the sum of $25,000.00 were not secured by the trust agreement.
4. When the trust is discharged, the commissioner as successor in
trust to the pledgor is entitled to the return of the pledged property.
5. A pledge to secure a specific debt cannot be held by the pledgee
as security for any other obligation, except by express agreement between the pledgor and pledgee.
6. The general rule of the rights of creditors to share in the
general assets of insolvent concerns before exhausting their security, is
not applicable here. The trust agreement here covers the rights of the
parties, and to disregard it would be an unwarranted interference with
their contractual relations.-Judgment affirmed.
215

216

DICTA

LIBEL--QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE-HARSH LANGUAGE NOT NECESSARILY MALICIOU--E. W. Bereman vs. The Power Publishing

Company et at.-No. 13006-Decided December 4, 1933Opinion bg Mr. Justice Butter.
Bereman brought suit against the publishing company and others,
alleging libel in that the Labor Advocate, a union labor paper, had said
of him that he had deserted the cause of union labor and was a traitor

to it.
Bereman, employed by Casey's Laundry, a union laundry, went

to Columbine Laundry, a non-union establishment, and without revealing the change, solicited business for the non-union place. The
editor had been told this much and also that the union would expel
Bereman. The union did expel him before the trial. Bereman was
non-suited at the trial.
Affirming the holding of the trial court, Mr. Justice Butler, for
the court, en banc, affirmed upon the ground that the communication
and publication was qualifiedly privileged. The Labor Advocate, a
group paper, circulating among union men, enjoyed the qualified privilege of printing and publishing matter of interest tp labor. While the
story printed was emphatic, used extravagant and harsh language, this
did not show malice requisite to sustain a cause of action in libel.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--SUFFICIENCY

OF EVIDENCE-FRAUD

-Rogers vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado et al.-No.
13342-Decided December 11, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
Rogers, an employee of Public Service Company of Colorado, filed
claims with the Commission for alleged injuries and claims were contested and decided against Rogers. He died and his widow sought and
was refused a review. Thereupon she brought this action seeking to
have the award of the Commission set aside on the ground of fraud.
General demurrers to her complaint were sustained below.
1. There is nothing in the evidence to justify a claim that the
award was procured by fraud. The only fraud alleged is the false,
colored and prejudicial testimony of witnesses for the company. The
evidence of the witnesses for the company were flatly contradicted by
witnesses for Rogers. The Commission had the sole power to find the
facts from this conflicting evidence.
2. While the statute provides that awards may be set aside on
the ground of fraud, a mere showing of conflicting evidence and an
allegation that some of it was false or that it was given by prejudiced
or interested witnesses, when such facts were before the Commission, is
no plea of such fraud as the statute contemplates.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck specially concurs.
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TAXATION -

EXEMPTION -

RELIGIOUS AND EDUCATIONAL USE

-

Kemp et at. vs. Pillar of Fire-No. 13017-Decided December
11, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Defendant in error is a corporation organized solely for religious,
educational and benevolent purposes. It owns and conducts a college
for both secular and religious instruction. The campus consists of 40
acres of land. Defendant also owns other land, aggregating about 200
acres, situated close to the campus. Part of this additional land is
used for raising produce for the sustenance of the students, part is
rented for cash, the cash rental being used exclusively for paying expenses of the college, and part of the land is idle. Most of the students
pay nothing toward their tuition or sustenance; a few students pay a
part. The college brought this action to have the said 200 acres of
additional land removed from the tax rolls.
1. The use to which property is put is the test of the right to
exemption, but the character of the owner sheds light on the nature of
the use.
2. Constitutional and statutory provisions exempting property
used for educational purposes are less strictly construed than those exempting property used for ordinary gain or profit.
3. The entire property of the college constitutes a unit. It is
reasonably necessary to effect the objects of the institution, and is used
solely for that purpose. Therefore, the entire property is exempt from

taxation.--Judgment affirmed.

WATER-ORAL

AGREEMENTS-ADVERSE

POSSESSION-Kountz

vs.

Olson and Perrinous. Olson-No. 13045-No. 13046-Decided
January 22, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
There was a dispute over water rights and priorities of decrees and
claims over possession of plaintiff to use of water for over thirty years
and payment of taxes on irrigated land for over seven years. Judgment
below for defendants.
1. Oral agreements concerning priorities and title to water rights,
followed with its change of possession and beneficial application, are
valid.
2. Where plaintiff for over thirty years asserted their claim to use
of the water and if necessary employed hostile methods to assert their
use and rights, this shows an uninterrupted, exclusive and open possession and establishes title to-same.

3.

Continuous use of a water right invests possession.

4. Possession of such water rights, considered as land, where
adverse and continuous for the period contemplated by the seven year
statute of limitations, coupled with payment of taxes, vests title.-

Judgment reversed.
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PLEADING--SUSTAINING GENERAL DEMURRER-CONTRACTS-WA-

TERS--District Landowners Trust, et a[. vs. Doherty-No. 13416
-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Henry L. Doherty brought suit to recover on a certificate of indebtedness issued by the District Landowners Trust for the sum of $225,000.00. General demurrer was sustained to the complaint and Doherty
was given judgment for $342,561.29 and costs.
1. Where a certificate of indebtedness refers to a separate declaration of trust, which by reference, was made a part thereof, such certificate of indebtedness must be construed in the light of the provisions
of the declaration of trust.
2. An unexecuted trust will not terminate because of delay on
the part of the trustee in executing it, notwithstanding the trust instrument directs its execution within a certain ime.
3. Where the certificate of indebtedness, which is the basis of
plaintiff's cause, contains conditions, the conditions must be regarded
as a part of the instrument.
4. Where the certificate of indebtedness is made payable at a certain date but by its provisions is tied to another instrument, a declaration of trust, and where there is another provision that the certificate
of indebtedness shall be payable on or before the termination of the trust
and the trust has not been terminated, the complaint fails to state a cause
of action, as the indebtedness is not shown to be due.
5. Where the payment of certificate of indebtedness is to be paid
out of a certain fund it is necessary to allege in the complaint the fulfillment of all conditions and the presence of such fund in order to state
a cause of action.--Judgment reversed.

INSURANCE-ACCEPTANCE---SUFFICIENCY

OF COMPLAINT-Clarke

vs. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United StatesNo. 13113-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Clarke brought suit in the Court below to recover on an accident
insurance policy, alleging that while riding in a bus in the State of
Kansas, she sustained accidental injury, and that it was a total and
permanent disability within the meaning of the disability provisions of
the policy and, also, that the accident caused the development and
growth of a goiter. The Court below sustained the general demurrer to
the complaint, but notwithstanding sustaining the demurrer, entered a
judgment for $50.00 in favor of the plaintiff which was acquiesced in
by the defendant.
1. While the entering of a judgment after the sustaining of a
general demurrer to a complaint presents an unusual procedure the
validity thereof is not passed upon.
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2. Where the complaint alleges that the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff as the result of an accident, were of a permanent nature and
that she took all necessary steps required by the policy to preserve her
rights, and there is no requirement in the policy either as to the time or
as to matter of substance, which the plaintiff was required to make compliance with as preliminary to her right to recovery that she did not
observe, the complaint states a cause of action.
3. The concessions of the defendant are equivalent to an admission that the injury which the plaintiff sustained entitles her to substantial compensation under the policy, and if the plaintiff was entitled
to anything at all, was entitled to more than the Court awarded her.Judgment reversed.

CONTRACTS-MERGER-IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF AGENT-Goldblatt
vs. Cannon as executor-No. 13033-Decided March 5, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff, as the executor of the estate of George McCarroll, deceased, brought this action against Goldblatt and others to recover judgment on two notes for $12,500.00 and $2,500.00 respectively. A
directed verdict was entered in favor of the plaintiff and Goldblatt alone
brings error.
1. Where one makes a loan secured by a deed of trust without
disclosing his principal and where thereafter, after default, there is no
foreclosure but the owner gives back to the agent making the loan a
deed for the property in which the name of the grantee is left blank, and
thereafter such agent kept and exercised control over the property, the
question of whether or not there was a merger and would be an extinguishment of the notes was a question of fact for the jury.
2. Whether or not such deed was delivered under an agreement
that the notes and trust deeds were to be cancelled was a question of
fact to be determined by the jury.
3. The jury should have been allowed to determine from the
facts and circumstances of the case whether by the acts of the original
owner, not in any way interfering with the agent, there was an implied
authority by acquiescence, such as would bind the owner. The owner
was bound if he allowed others to believe that the agent's authority was
greater than actually existed.
4. In law a merger always takes place when a greater estate and
less estate coincide and meet in one and the same person, in one and the
same right, without any intermediate estate, unless a contrary intent
appears and such intention is a question of fact to be tried and determined in the same manner as are other issues.-Judgment reversed.Mr. Justice Bouch dissents.
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SCHOOL DISTRICTS-COUNTIES--FINES

AND PENALTIES TO WHOM

PAYABLE--City and County of Denver vs. School District No.

I

-No. 13084-Decided March 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
The School District filed this suit in the District Court against the
City in the nature of assumpsit to recover one-half of the moneys paid
into the County treasury, from various Courts in the County, collected
by said Courts for violations of state laws as fines imposed for the
punishment of crimes and misdemeanors between July 1, 1923, and
August 31, 1929, one-half of all moneys theretofore having been properly paid into the State treasury for the Policeman's Benefit Fund. The
facts were stipulated and judgment was rendered in favor of the School
District for $72,299.59.
1. By a statute enacted in 1861 all fines imposed for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors are paid into the County treasury
unless otherwise expressly directed. Under a later statute enacted in
1876 it was provided that all sums of money derived from fines imposed
for violation of orders of injunction, mandamus and other like writs,
and all fines collected within the several counties for breach of the penal
laws shall be paid over to the County Treasurer and by him credited to
the general county school fund.
2. The latter statute supersedes the earlier one.
3.
Where two statutes of different dates exist, apparent conflicts
should be reconciled and the statutes construed so as to give effect to the
provisions of each, but where there is an irreconcilable conflict as in this
case where the moneys are directly paid into the separate, distinct and
different funds by each statute, then the latter statute prevails.
4. The words "Penal laws" as used in the latter statute are not
confined to penalties imposed for violation of orders of injunction,
mandamus and other like writs or for contempt of Court, but include
laws for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors.
5. The latter act having been for over half a century acquiesced
in by executive and administrative bodies, such construction should be
disregarded only for most cogent reasons.-Judgment affirmed.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW-LIABILITY

FOR NEGLIGENCE-Radetsky vs.

Montgomery et al.-No. 13104-Decided March 5, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Norton Montgomery and Erskine Myer sued M. S. Radetsky for
attorney fees. Radetsky defended on the ground that in the rendition of
their professional services the defendants were guilty of such gross negligence and incompetence as to make their services valueless, and also filed
a counterclaim for damages. The case was heard by the Court below
without a jury and the Court found the issues on both the complaint
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and the counterclaim for the plaintiffs, the attorneys, and rendered
judgment in their favor. Radetsky admits that if the plaintiffs are entitled to anything they are entitled to the amount sued for.
1. An attorney must be held to undertake to use a reasonable
degree of skill and care, and to possess to a reasonable extent the knowledge requisite to a proper performance of the duties of his profession. If
injury results to the client as a proximate consequence of the want of
such knowledge or skill or from the failure to exercise such care, he must
respond in damages to the extent of the injury sustained by his client.
An attorney is liable for all damage resulting to his client for reason
of improper or erroneous advice, where an attorney of reasonable knowledge and professional capacity, exercising ordinary care under the circumstances, would have avoided the error.
2. Evidence examined and held to sustain the finding of the trial
Court that the attorneys were not guilty of actionable negligence either
in the matter of the leases or in the matter of handling the execution sale
of purchase property.-Judgmentaffirmed.
INSURANCE-ACCEPTANCE-REFORMATION -

The Pacific Mutual

Life Insurance of California vs. Alice M. Clarke-No. 13215Decided March 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
The defendant insurance company issued to plaintiff, Alice M.
Clarke, an accident and health insurance policy. While it was in force
the plaintiff was seriously injured while riding in a bus. Defendant
insurer disclaimed liability under the policy. Plaintiff thereupon brought
this action in which she asked for a reformation of the policy and for
disability payments and for the return of a premium which she had
paid during the time of the disability which, by the terms of the policy,
should not have been paid. She recovered judgment below for the
premium she had paid, with interest.
1. The evidence below was sufficient to sustain the finding of
the Court that she was entitled to recover back the premium paid during
the time the disability existed.
2. The disability commenced on October 11, 1930, the day
plaintiff stopped her work because of the accideznt.-Judgment affirmed.
TAXATION-EXEMPTION

OF

RELIGIOUS

INSTITUTIONS-Colorado

Tax Commission vs. The Denver Bible Institute-No. 12959Decided March 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
A judgment was entered by the District Court in favor of the Denver Bible Institute when the Colorado Tax Commission stood upon a
general demurrer. The judgment orders a refund of the 1929 taxes and
the striking of the Institute's property from the tax roll, on the ground
that the complaint showed that its property was exempt.
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1. Where a complaint alleges that the Colorado Bible Institute
is a corporation not for profit and organized to establish and maintain
a Bible Institute for the instruction and training of Christian men and
women and the knowledge of the word of God, and that its property
that is assessed for taxation is ,not in any manner to be used for profit
but solely and wholly for the purposes above set forth, such complaint
states a good cause of action against a general demurrer and the judgment of the Court ordering a refund of taxation and striking of the
property from the tax roll is correct.
2. Where a complaint is attacked by general demurrer only and
the demurrer does not raise the question of jurisdiction of the Court
then C. L. 1921, Section 7291 in reference to first applying to the
county assessor for relief does not apply. This could only be raised by
a special demurrer to the jurisdiction.--udgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--CONSTRUING
SIoN-The

FINDING OF COMMIS-

C. S. Card Iron Works Company et al. vs. Radovich

-No. 13466-Decided March 5, 1934--Opinior2 by Mr. Justice
Burke.
While claimant was employed by company, he suffered a strained
back. Upon a hearing before the Commission a finding was entered that
the back strain augmented a previously existing diseased condition and
that temporary disability ended December 30, 1930, and that there was
no permanent disability and compensation was paid accordingly. Two
and one-half years later, claimant asked for rehearing which was had
and Commission confirmed former award. The District Court vacated
same and ordered Commission to find the extent of claimant's permanent
partial disability.
1. It was the intention of the Commission when it found that
the accident augmented the previously existing diseased condition to find
that the injury contributed to the disability from May 1, 1930, to
December 30, 1930, at which time the claimant wholly recovered from
the back strain and that no disability thereafter evident was in any way
connected with it.--Judgment reversed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT

INJURY---Jabot vs. Industrial Commission et al.-No. 13458-

Decided March 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Claimant was injured November 8, 1932, but failed to notify employer and did not leave his employment until February 6, 1933. The
Commission found that temporary disability terminated June 1, 1933,
and there was no permanent disability and that claimant failed to notify
employer until some weeks after he left his work and that the employee
must be penalized one day's compensation for each day's failure to report
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his accident, as a result of which penalty, the claimant was entitled to
no compensation beyond that for medical services. The District Court
affirmed the award.
1. The penalty section of the Workmen's Compensation Law
which provides that employee shall lose one day's compensation for each
day's failure to report an accident, is in clear language and unambiguous
and was properly enforced in this case.--Judgment affirmed.
REPLEVIN-EFFECT OF PARTIAL PAYMENTS AFTER DEFAULT ON
CHATTEL MORTGAGE-TESTIMONY AS TO VALUE-RIGHT TO
TAKE POSSESSION WHERE MORTGAGEE FEELS INSECURE-

Thomas vs. Berine-No. 13170-Decided March 12, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff filed his complaint i, replevin to recover immediate possession of cattle described in chattel mortgage on the ground that he felt
insecure and for failure to pay interest. Defendant answered denying
failure to pay interest and alleging extension and denied insecurity, and
on trial the verdict was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff seeks reversal.
1. Although partial payments made previous to the maturity of
a debt do not affect the mortgagee'9 right to the possession of the entire
property, in the absence of a provision in the instrument to that effect,
partial payment made after default and accepted by the mortgagee is
to be regarded as a waiver by the mortgagee, of his strict legal rights,
and the rights of the parties are the same as if payment on the indebtedness had been extended.
2. Where a mortgagee seeks possession of property under chattel
mortgage on the ground of insecurity in the debt, his determination
must be reached in good faith and his judgment founded on reasonable
grounds and probable causes. He must show some ground that would
cause him to be apprehensive. This was a question for the jury.
3. Whether a witness's opinion on the value of cattle is admissible or not is a question for the trial Court to determine and the
decision of the trial Court is conclusive unless clearly shown to be
erroneous in matter of law.--Judgment affirmed.
QUIET TITLE-RESCISSION-FORFEITURE-ADEQUATE

REMEDY AT

LAw-The Laramie-PoudreIrrigationCo. vs. Red Feather Lakes
Resort, Inc.-No. 13124-Decided March 12, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, filed suit to remove clouds from
the title to its property, occasioned by a written agreement between
plaintiff and the predecessor in interest of the defendant. Demurrers to
the amended complaint were sustained and plaintiff elected to stand
and the case was dismissed. Plaintiff brings error.
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1. In an action to quiet title and for rescission of the contract,
where the contract contains no provision for forfeiture or rescission and
the complaint affirmatively shows that there has been a substantial part
of the contract performed, and there is no allegation of damage, under
such circumstances a claim for forfeiture is looked upon with disfavor
and, particularly, is this true where the complaint affords no suggestion as to how the defendant could be placed in status quo.
2. Where it appears that plaintiff seeks to rescind as to part of
contract and accept the benefits from the complete or partial performance
of parts of the contract he has no standing.
3. Rescission must be of an entire contract, not merely a part.
4. Equity will not decree a forfeiture unless the strict letter of the

contract requires it.
5. Where it appears from the complaint that the contract contains no provision for rescission and it is apparent that damages, if any,
can be ascertained and compensated in an action at law, equity will not
grant relief for quieting title and rescission.-Judgment affirmed.

AUTOMOBILES--INJURY TO GUEST-VARIANCE-DEFECTIVE TIRE

-Henry vs. Strobel et at.-No. 12900-1-Deided March 19,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Henry was defendant in two cases wherein the Court below without a jury rendered two judgments for damages arising out of the same
automobile accident, the plaintiff in each case being in Henry's car as
a guest. The cases were consolidated for trial. The complaints, among
other things, alleged that the tires were old, worn, greatly weakened
and rotten and unfit for use, which was well known to the defendant
and unknown to plaintiffs and that on this account one of the front
tires blew out, causing the automobile to leave the highway and crash
into a ditch and pole. The Court awarded damages to one guest for
$2,750.00 and to the other for $750.00.
1. Where the plaintiff immediately after the accident stated that
the tire was worn out and no good and he intended to get a new one
and that it had gone over 20,000 miles and was over two years old,
and that he intended to get a new one for some time but neglected to do
so, such evidence would support the inference that Henry was guilty of
negligence.

2. Where the complaint charges both an unfit condition of the
tire and Henry's knowledge thereof and also charges negligent operation, there is no variance.
3. This was a case where it was incumbent upon the Judge before whom the case was tried without jury to do his best in the way
of analyzing and interpreting the evidence and of applying correct legal

principles and no prejudicial error is revealed by the result.-Judgment
affirmed.
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